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MARYLAND'S PROMPT CRIMINAL TRIAL
PROVISIONS: HICKS AND BEYOND
Harold Douglas Nortont
In 1971, the Maryland General Assembly and court of appeals adopted the prompt trial provisions. It was not until the
court's 1979 decision in State v. Hicks, however, that the "teeth"
were put into the provisions, by supplying dismissal as the sanction for violation of the defendant's rights under the prompt trial
provisions. Since that time, there has been an abundance of litigation in an attempt to clarify the applicability of the provisions
and the sanction. In this article, the author presents a practical
guide to the Maryland prompt trial provisions, analyzing the provisions and the wealth of recent case law.

Postponement of cases from dates scheduled for trial is
one of the major factors contributing to delay in the administration of justice, civil as well as criminal. Courts and court
supporting services spend substantial time "spinning their
wheels," in rescheduling cases. Available court time is lost.
The time of attorneys and witnesses is lost. Witnesses themselves are lost. Those who are not are put in severe inconvenience as well as actual loss, and end up in despair at the
frustrations of being involved in the trial of a case in the courts.
The very image of the judicial system is in serious jeopardy.
Public confidence in the courts as instruments of the people is
impaired. Judges and lawyers cannot blame the "system," for
they are the people who run that system.
When the Legislature has expressed the will of the people
by saying that the date established for the trial of a criminal
case shall not be postponed except for extraordinary cause, and
has denied all judges but the administrative head of the court
authority to exercise even that curtailed power, the message
should be loud and clear to the bench, the bar, parties, witnesses, and to the public, that trials must not and will not be
postponed for ordinary reasons. 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 25, 1979, those words written by Judge Powers rang "loud
and clear" as the Court of Appeals of Maryland held, in State v. Hicks,2
that the Maryland "prompt trial provisions,"3 article 27, section 591 and

t

B.A., Washington College, 1978; J.D., University of Baltimore School of Law, 1981;
Associate, Brown, Brown, Brown & Waldron, Bel Air, Maryland.
1. Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 573-74, 318 A.2d 243, 248-49 (powers, J.),
cert. denied, 272 Md. 742 (1974).
2. 285 Md. 310,403 A.2d 356 (1979).
3. For the purposes of this article, former Md. R.P. 746 (Supp. 1983), MD. R.P. 4-271,
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former Maryland Rule 746 were mandatory.4 The Hicks court held that
when the trial date in a criminal case in the circuit courts is postponed
beyond a period of 180 days from the first appearance by the defendant
or his counsel, s the charges shall be dismissed with prejudice, 6 absent a
finding of "good cause"7 for the postponement by the hearing judge, 8 or
a waiver of the prompt trial penalty by the defendant. 9
Since the Hicks decision, the Maryland appellate courts have been
inundated with cases demanding further explanation of the prompt trial
provisions and how they are to be applied. This article will outline the
parameters of the Maryland prompt trial provisions with an eye toward
familiarizing the practitioner with their requirements. It will discuss the
analysis employed by the Maryland appellate courts for determining
whether the prompt trial provisions have been satisfied, and will point
out the pitfalls that may be encountered by both prosecution and defense
in their efforts to comply.
II.

PROMPT TRIAL IN RETROSPECT

In 1971, the Maryland General Assembly enacted section 591 of
article 27, which provided for trial of a criminal defendant within six
months of personal appearance or appearance of counsel. lO Postpone-

4.
5.

6.

7.

8.

9.
10.

and MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1984), are referred to collectively as the
"prompt trial provisions." By contrast, the federal and state constitutional protections are referred to collectively as the "speedy trial provisions."
State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 334-35,403 A.2d 356,360,369 (1979). Md. R.P.
746 (Supp. 1983) has been stylistically reworked into MD. R.P. 4-271 without substantive change. See infra note 39 (text of rule 4-271).
The time period prescribed by the prompt trial provisions stands at 180 days. MD.
ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1984); Md. R.P. 746a (Supp. 1983); MD. R.P. 4271(a). See generally infra notes 10-46 and accompanying text (evolution of prompt
trial requirements); infra Section III (mechanics of prompt trial); infra Appendix
(prompt triaVspeedy trial diagram).
See State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 335, 403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979); see also State v.
Armstrong, 46 Md. App. 641, 651,421 A.2d 98, 104 (1980) (state may not reindict
defendant for charges previously dismissed for prompt trial violation); Joseph,
Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 611, 611-12 (1980). See
generally infra Section VI (dismissal penalty).
The prompt trial provisions condition postponement of a trial date on "good cause
shown" by the requesting party. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1984); Md.
R.P. 746b (Supp. 1983); MD. R.P. 4-271 (b). See generally infra notes 10-30 and
accompanying text (evolution of prompt trial requirements); infra Section IV(B)
(good cause for postponement).
MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1984); Md. R.P. 746b (Supp. 1983); MD.
R.P.4-271(b). For purposes ofthis article, the county administrative judge and his
designees are referred to collectively as hearing judges. See generally infra Section
IV(B) (approval of postponement).
See State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 335,403 A.2d 356,369 (1979). See generally infra
Section V (waiver of prompt trial penalty).
The full text of MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 591 (1971) read as follows:
(a) Within two weeks after the arraignment of a person accused of a
criminal offense, or within two weeks after the filing of an appearance of
counselor the appointment of counsel for an accused in any criminal mat-
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ments under section 591 were to be made for "extraordinary cause
shown" and by the county administrative judge only.l1 Soon thereafter,
the court of appeals, as authorized by subsection 591(b),12 adopted former Maryland Rule 740, which incorporated section 591 by reference. 13
Days later, in Young v. State,I4 these two expressions of legislative and
judicial policy were held by the court of special appeals to be directory
only,lS because no penalty had been provided for their violation. 16 The
court pointed out, however, that the penalty of dismissal is always available to a defendant for a violation of constitutional speedy trial rights
and that non-compliance with the state prompt trial provisions is "unquestionably a factor" to be considered in determining if a defendant's
rights have been violated,l1 Not until 1977, during its inspired revision
of Chapter 700 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, did the court of
appeals enact former Maryland Rule 746 and shorten the time in which a
defendant must be brought to trial from six months to 120 days. IS How-

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.

ter, whichever shall occur first, a judge or other designated official of the
Circuit Court or the Criminal Court of Baltimore City in which the matter
is pending, shall set a date for the trial of the case, which date shall be not
later than six months from the date of the arraignment of the person accused or the appearance or the appointment of counsel for the accused
whichever occurs first. The date established for the trial of the matter
shall not be postponed except for extraordinary cause shown by the moving party and only with the permission of the administrative judge of the
court where the matter is pending.
(b) The judges of the Court of Appeals of Maryland are authorized
to establish additional rules of practice and procedure for the implementation of this section in the Criminal Court of Baltunore City and in the
various circuit courts throughout the State of Maryland.
[d. at § 591(a).
[d. at § 591(b).
The rule read that "[t]he date of trial and postponement shall be governed by code,
Article 27, section 591," Md. R.P. 740 (1972), and was adopted by the court of
appeals on June 1, 1972.
15 Md. App. 707, 292 A.2d 137, affd per curiam, 266 Md. 438, 294 A.2d 467
(1972).
[d. at 710, 292 A.2d at 139.
[d.
[d. at 710-11, 292 A.2d at 139; accord State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 36,425 A.2d
1044, 1048 (1981); Wise v. State, 47 Md. App. 656, 675, 425 A.2d 652,663, cert.
denied, 290 Md. 724, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981); Wilson V. State, 44 Md.
App. 1, 7, 408 A.2d 102, 106 (1979), cert. denied, 286 Md. 755, cert. denied, 446
U.S. 921 (1980). "While the rule (and presumably the statute) are considered . . .
to be nonconstitutional procedural rules . . . it is apparent from the similarity of
purpose and sanction adopted to enforce them, that when considering the length of
delay in bringing an accused to trial in the constitutional speedy trial context, the
[prompt trial] time factors . . . should not have been-and cannot now-be ignored." Wilson, 44 Md. App. at 7, 408 A.2d at 106. But see Hicks, 285 Md. at 320,
403 A.2d at 361 (time limits prescribed by prompt trial provisions are not the only
"length of delay" measure of defendants' speedy trial rights). See generally infra
note 37 and accompanying text (availability of speedy trial protection); infra Section
III (interplay of prompt trial and speedy trial); infra Appendix (prompt trial/speedy
trial diagram).
The original text offormer Md. R.P. 746 (1979) read as follows:
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ever, because Rule 746 was also viewed as directory, "[t]he result was
almost wholesale violations of its provisions."19
Finally, in State v. Hicks,20 the court of appeals "cleared the waters,"21 holding the prompt trial provisions mandatory and dismissal of
the charges as the appropriate penalty for their violation. 22 On motion
by the state for reconsideration, the court made it clear that it intended
to overrule Young and require mandatory dismissal. 23 The court, however, carved out two possible exceptions to the penalty of mandatory dismissal: (1) failure to set the trial date within 30 days of appearance,24
and (2) "where the defendant, either individually or by his attorney,
seeks or expressly consents to a trial date in violation of Rule 746."25
The court declared its ruling to be prospective only.26
As noted earlier, "wholesale violations" of the prompt trial provisions under their directory interpretation led the court of appeals to mandate the "draconian sanction" of dismissal. 27 Yet the court in Hicks left
for specUlation what type of dismissal is warranted. One commentator
concluded that dismissal should be absolute, or at least presumed abso-

19.
20.
21.
22.

23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

a. General Provision.
Within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first
appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723 (Appearance-Provision for or Waiver of Counsel), a trial date shall be set
which shall be not later than 120 days after the appearance or waiver of
counselor after the appearance of defendant before the court pursuant to
Rule 723 (Appearance-Provision for or Waiver of Counsel).
b. Change of Trial Date.
Upon motion of a party made in writing or in open court and for extraordinary cause shown, the county administrative judge or a judge designated by him may grant a change of trial date.
State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 33,425 A.2d 1044, 1046 (1981).
285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979).
State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 33, 425 A.2d 1044, 1047 (1981).
State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979). "Although, to be
precise, Hicks' holding referred to the 120-day Rule, the holding has been applied
with equal force to the Rule as amended." Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 180
n.2, 426 A.2d 415,421 n.2 (1981). See supra note 18 (text of former Md. R.P. 746).
State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334-35,403 A.2d 356, 370 (1979).
Id. at 335, 403 A.2d at 369. See generally infra Section IV (initial setting of a trial
date).
State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 335, 403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979). See generally infra
Section V (waiver of prompt trial provisions).
State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334, 403 A.2d 356, 368-69 (1979). For examples of
application of the Hicks rule see, e.g., State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 31-35,425
A.2d 1044, 1047-48 (1980); Leonard v. State, 46 Md. App. 631, 634, 421 A.2d 85,
87 (1980), affd per curiam, 290 Md. 295, 429 A.2d 538 (1981); Chance v. State, 45
Md. App. 521, 525, 414 A.2d 535, 536 (1980); Gasque v. State, 45 Md. App. 471,
478, 413 A.2d 1351, 1355 (1980); Leuschner v. State, 45 Md. App. 323, 357, 413
A.2d 227, 246, cert. denied, 288 Md. 739 (1980), vacated, 451 U.S. 1014 (1981);
State V. Hiken, 43 Md. App. 259, 271, 405 A.2d 284, 291 (1979).
Joseph, supra note 6, at 619 (quoting United States V. Jones, 524 F.2d 834, 852
(D.C. Cir. 1975»; see State V. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334, 403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979);
State V. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 33, 425 A.2d 1044, 1046 (1981).
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lute, as it is with speedy trial violations,28 because "[t]he announced intention of the Hicks court to put 'teeth' into the [prompt trial provisions]
would be rendered largely negatory were the State permitted to recommence prosecution after an illegal delay."29 This question has been laid
to rest by State v. Armstrong,30 in which the court of special appeals held
that prosecution of charges dismissed for prompt trial violations is impermissible under both prompt and speedy trial analysis. 31 Charges dismissed for substantive deficiencies, however, may be refiled, causing the
l80-day period to begin anew,32 as may be charges that are entered nolle
prosequi, unless the purpose or effect of such entry is to circumvent
prompt trial requirements. 33
Because of the concern expressed by the bench and prosecutorial bar
over the cataclysmic effect that Hicks might have on the criminal justice
system,34 the time period offormer Rule 746 was increased to 180 days,3S
and the extraordinary cause condition was demoted to good cause in both
the rule 36 and statute. 37 The rule is presently designated as Rule 4-271
28. Loker, The Effect of State v. Hicks on the Scheduling & Postponement of Trials
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 746, 2 MARYLAND PROSECUTOR 29, 30 (1979); see
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438-41 (1973).
29. Loker, supra note 28, at 30; see also State v. Annstrong, 46 Md. App. 641, 651, 421
A.2d 98, 104 (1980) (defendant may not be retried for charges dismissed for prompt
trial violation); Joseph, supra note 6, at 641 (authority split on this issue).
30. 46 Md. App. 641, 421 A.2d 98 (1980).
31. Id. at 651, 421 A.2d at 104; see also Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438-41
(1973) (federal Constitution). See generally Joseph, supra note 6, at 611-12 (dismissal with prejudice is typical penalty under most state speedy or prompt trial
schemes); Rubine, Speedy Trial Schemes and Criminal Justice Deals, 57 CORNELL
L. REv. 794, 811-12 (1971-72) (dismissal with prejudice necessary to compel compliance with state's duty to try defendant promptly).
32. State v. Phillips, 299 Md. 468, 474 A.2d 512 (1984); Md. R.P. 746 (Supp. 1983);
MD. R.P. 4-271(a).
33. Curley v. State, 299 Md. 449, 462, 474 A.2d 502, 508 (1984); State v. Glenn, 299
Md. 464, 474 A.2d 509 (1984).
34. See State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 34, 425 A.2d 1044, 1047 (1981); see also Note,
Criminal Procedure-Maryland Rule 746--Scheduling Criminal Cases for TrialMaryland Rule 746 Requires That Criminal Charges be Dismissed When State Fails
to Bring Case to Trial Within Prescribed Period and Fails to Establish Extraordinary
Cause Justifying Postponement. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979), 9
U. BALT. L. REv. 473,489-92 (1980) (effect of Hicks on judicial system).
35. Court of Appeals of Md., Rules Order of Nov. 16, 1979,6 Md. Admin. Reg. 1915
(1979). See generally State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 34, 425 A.2d 1044, 1047
(1981); Note, supra note 34, at 490-91.
36. Court of Appeals of Md., Rules Order of July 3, 1980, 7 Md. Admin. Reg. 1414
(1980). See generally State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 34, 425 A.2d 1044, 1047
(1981) (evolution of prompt trial rule); Note, supra note 34, at 492.
37. Act of May 6, 1980, ch. 378, 1980 Md. Laws 1283. The statutory two week period
for scheduling the initial trial date, however, has been pre-empted by the rule. State
v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979). MD. R.P. 4-271 only
changes fonner Md. R.P. 746 (Supp. 1983) stylistically and adds the district court
counterpart, MD. DIST. RULE 746, to subsection (c) for organizational purposes.
See infra note 38 (text of MD. R.P. 4-271). The text of MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 591 (Supp. 1984) now reads as follows:
§ 591. Setting date for trial; postponement.
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and is virtually identical to former Rule 746. 38
In order to understand decisions involving prompt trial issues, the
public policy considerations voiced by the court in Hicks must be considered. The Hicks court was careful to distinguish nonconstitutional
prompt trial from constitutional speedy trial, and explained that the state
prompt trial provisions were enacted to minimize the societal effects of
excessive delay in the criminal justice system rather than the effects of
such delay on an individual defendant. 39 The court stated that by adopting the rule it intended to "put teeth into a new regulation governing the
assignment of criminal cases for trial. . . ."40 In Hicks, the defendant's
incarceration in another jurisdiction on the scheduled trial date
amounted to extraordinary cause for postponement. 41 The court stated,
however, that
in so concluding, we intend no departure from the established
law that the mere fact that defendant is incarcerated in another
jurisdiction does not relieve the State of its Sixth Amendment
obligation to grant the accused his constitutional right to a
speedy trial . . . . The time limits prescribed by Rule 746 are
not, however, the measure of the Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial. While the rule was adopted to facilitate the
prompt disposition of criminal cases, it stands on a different
legal footing than the Sixth Amendment constitutional right to

38.

39.
40.
41.

(a) Within two weeks after the arraignment of a person accused of a
criminal offense, or within two weeks after the filing of an appearance of
counselor the appointment of counsel for an accused in any criminal matter, whichever shall occur first, a judge or other designated official of the
circuit court in which the matter is pending, shall set a date for the trial of
the case, which date shall be not later than 180 days from the date of the
arraignment of the person accused or the appearance or the appointment
of counsel for the accused whichever occurs first. The date established for
the trial of the matter shall not be postponed except for good cause shown
by the moving party and only with the permission of the administrative
judge of the court where the matter is pending.
(b) The judges of the Court of Appeals of Maryland are authorized to
establish additional rules of practice and procedure for the implementation
of this section in the various circuit courts throughout the State of
Maryland.
Rule 4-271. TRIAL DATE.
(a) Trial Date in Circuit Court.-The date for trial in the circuit
court shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of
counselor the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court
pursuant to Rule 4-213, and shall be not later than 180 days after the
earlier of those events. On motion of a party, or on the court's initiative,
and for good cause shown, the county administrative judge or that judge's
designee may grant a change of a circuit court trial date.
(b) Change of Trial Date in District Court.-The date for trial in
the District Court may be changed on motion of a party and for good
cause shown.
State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 316,403 A.2d 356, 359 (1979).
[d. at 318, 403 A.2d at 360.
[d. at 318-20, 403 A.2d at 360-61.

1985]

Prompt Criminal Trial Provisions

453

a speedy trial. 42
Thus, although the sixth amendment grants to a defendant a "personal" right to speedy trial,43 "[t]he purpose of [the prompt trial provisions], which require an accused to be tried within [180] days of his or his
attorney's appearance [are] to protect society's interest in an effective
criminal justice system."44 As will be evident throughout this article, it
is crucial that practitioners be familiar with the difference between the
constitutional speedy trial right and the nonconstitutional prompt trial
provisions. 4s
42. Id. at 320, 403 A.2d at 361-62 (emphasis added); see Note, supra note 34, at 487-89.
But see supra note 17 and accompanying text (prompt trial period used as guage of
speedy trial delay factor).
43. u.s. CoNST. amend. VI (right of "accused" to speedy trial); see State v. Lattisaw,48
Md. App. 20, 29, 425 A.2d 1051, 1056 (speedy trial right is personal), cert. denied,
290 Md. 717 (1981).
44. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 321,403 A.2d 356, 362 (1979) (Davidson, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 142,461 A.2d 543, 546-67 (1983)
(prompt trial provisions promote efficiency), cert. denied, 298 Md. 708, 473 A.2d
458 (1984); Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 229,458 A.2d 480,484 (1983) (good
cause where movant exercised diligence and "need to postpone outweighs the detriment to the public interest from delay"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v.
Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984). See generally infra Section IV(B) (good
cause for postponement).
45. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . . "
Because this right is viewed as "fundamental," it applies to the several states by
operation of the fourteenth amendment. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213, 223 (1967); see also MD. CONST. art. 21, which reads:
That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be informed of
the accusation against him; to have a copy of the Indictment, or charge, in
due time (if required) to prepare for his defense; to be allowed counsel; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have process for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses for and against him on oath; and to a
speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he
ought not to be found guilty.
"[O]pinions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial are 'very persuasive, although not necessarily controlling,' as to the
proper construction of Maryland's parallel Article 21 right." Smith v. State, 276
Md. 521, 527, 350 A.2d 628,632 (1976); see also Erbe v. State, 276 Md. 541, 545-46,
350 A.2d 640, 642-43 (1976) (discussion of sixth amendment deemed equally applicable to Declaration of Rights, Art. 21 for purposes of decision).
Although there may be many sources of speedy and prompt trial rights, the
federal Constitutional right looms over the entire criminal litigation and, when all
else fails, "provides ultimate speedy trial protection; irrespective of extraconstitutional, or even state constitutional, protections . . . . " Joseph, supra note 6, at 642.
See generally infra Appendix (prompt trial/speedy trial diagram).
Despite its broad reach, the sixth amendment "provides only a minimum standard of protection," as applied, and states are free to provide more protection than
the federal right by statute, rule, or common law. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 614;
Erbe v. State, 276 Md. 541, 545-46, 350 A.2d 640, 642-43 (1976) (state court need
not always follow the lead of the Supreme Court, but may accord greater individual
rights).
The Maryland prompt trial provisions are extraconstitutional in nature, and
the Hicks majority was quick to point out the mutual exclusivity of speedy trial and
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Another source of confusion stems from the use of terms "postponement" and "continuance. "46 Postponement refers to the rescheduling of
the trial date before commencement of the trial; continuance refers to
rescheduling within the trial itself. As will be evident throughout this
article, this is an important distinction.
III.

APPLICABILITY OF THE PROMPT TRIAL PROVISIONS
A proper starting point for determining if the prompt trial provi-

prompt trial rights. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 320,403 A.2d 356, 361-62 (1979).
Therefore, the 18O-day period is not the measure of a defendant's speedy trial right,
but is more restrictive than the constitutional provision. Note, supra note 34, at
488-89. But see supra note 17 and accompanying text (l80-day period used as
benchmark in speedy trial analysis). Similarly, the speedy trial balancing test is not
the balancing test for prompt trial. State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264, 458 A.2d
487,490, cerro denied, 296 Md. 60 (1983). Theoretically, a defendant may request
postponement for good cause under prompt trial analysis and, in the same breath,
demand a speedy trial.
Because the penalty for prompt trial violations is dismissal with prejudice, a
finding for the defendant will ordinarily render the constitutional speedy trial issue
moot. If, however, there is no prompt trial violation, a separate constitutional
speedy trial analysis is required to determine whether the charges should be dismissed. See, e.g., Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984); State v.
Brookins, 299 Md. 59, 472 A.2d 465 (1984); Satchell V. State,-54 Md. App. 333,458
A.2d 853 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 42, 472 A.2d 457 (1984); see also Joseph, supra note
6, at 616; Note, supra note 34, at 487-89 (demarcation between constitutional and
extraconstitutional speedy trial rights).
Because, however, the prompt trial provisions may allow postponement of the
trial date beyond a period of time that may be constitutionally significant, that the
defendant's prompt trial rights have not been violated does not mean that his speedy
trial rights have not been abridged. Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452
(1984); Joseph, supra note 6, at 618; see Note, supra note 34, at 487-89. Therefore,
the administrative judge or his designee should see that the postponement is not
extended for an unconstitutional length of time. See, e.g., State v. Farinholt, 54 Md.
App. 124, 133 n.5, 458 A.2d 442, 449 n.5, affd, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984);
Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 231, 458 A.2d 480, 485 (1983), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984); State v. Green,
54 Md. App. 260, 264, 458 A.2d 487, 490 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 72,472 A.2d 472
(1984). See generally infra Section IV(C) (approval of postponements).
Like most other states, Maryland has adopted the balancing test set forth in
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as a guide to determine violations of speedy
trial rights. See, e.g., State v. Hunter, 16 Md. App. 306, 295 A.2d 779 (1972); see R.
GILBERT & C. MOYLAN, JR., MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 42.3 (1983); see Comment, The Right to a Speedy Trial in Maryland, 6 U.
BALT. L. REv. 47, 54-55 (1976) (balancing test analysis); Joseph, supra note 6, at
613 (balancing test analysis and its wide acceptance).
Four factors are to be weighed in this process. They are (1) length of delay;
(2) reason for delay; (3) prejudice to the accused; and (4) waiver of speedy trial
penalty by the accused. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); see Comment,
supra, at 50-67; R. GILBERT & C. MOYLAN, JR., supra, at § 42.3-42.8. Once delay
moves the trial date to beyond a constitutionally significant period, both speedy and
prompt trial rights may be asserted. See Note, supra note 34, at 487-89. See generally infra Section VI (motion to dismiss); infra Appendix (prompt trial/speedy trial
diagram).
46. See State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 130-32, 458 A.2d 442, 448 (1983), affd,
299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984).
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sions apply to a particular case is Maryland Rule 4-271(a), which exclusively applies the prompt trial provisions to criminal cases being tried in
the circuit courtS. 47 Thus, the mandatory dismissal penalty does not apply to cases brought and tried in the District Court of Maryland. 48
Moreover, when a defendant is first charged in the district court but is
later indicted in the circuit court, time spent at the district court level is
not part of the 180-day period. 49
The prompt trial provisions may also be defined by their exceptions.so For example, they do not apply to delay between arrest and initial appearance in the circuit court. sl Nor do they apply once a trial date
is postponed beyond 180 days for good cause shown. Once a trial date is
properly postponed beyond that limit, a defendant's rights are protected
only by the constitutional speedy trial provisions. 52 The same is true
once trial has begun: "except as limited by statute or rule, a trial court
has inherent authority to control its own docket,"s3 and the prompt trial
provisions do not limit this authority. 54 Thus, the trial judge may grant a
continuance so long as it does not violate the defendant's constitutional
47. The text of MD. R.P. 4-271 is set out supra note 38. It is clear that subsection (a) of
the rule does not affect subsection (b), which concerns change of trial date in the
district court only, and is a virtual replica of former Maryland District Rule 746.
Former Rule 746 refers to Md. R.P. 723 (1983) (appearance), also a circuit court
rule. See Scott v. State, 49 Md. App. 70, 86,430 A.2d 615, 623, cert. denied, 291
Md. 781 (1981); see also MD. R.P. 4-271 (trial date) (reference to MD. R.P. 4-213
(appearance».
48. E.g., Scott v. State, 49 Md. App. 70, 86,430 A.2d 615, 623, cert. denied, 291 Md.
781 (1981).
49. Where a district court proceeding is terminated and the state seeks an indictment by
way of grand jury, "[t]here is no provision for tacking the time between the District
Court charge and a subsequent grand jury indictment to the time that begins running under the rule in the Circuit Court." Pearson V. State, 53 Md. App. 217, 21920, 452 A.2d 1252, 1254 (1982). There is a split of authority on this point in other
jurisdictions. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 641. But cf State V. Armstrong, 46 Md.
App. 641, 651, 421 A.2d 98, 104 (1980) (state may not reindict defendant on
charges dismissed under prompt trial provisions).
50. See State V. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984).
51. E.g., Pearson V. State, 53 Md. App. 217, 219-20, 452 A.2d 1252, 1254 (1982). Such
inquiry "would raise difficult problems of proof." Rubine, supra note 31, at 806
n.58 (quoting ABA Standards § 2.2(a), Comment at 23 (1972».
52. See, e.g., State V. Glenn, 299 Md. 464, 467-68, 474 A.2d 509, 511 (1984); Farinholt
V. State, 299 Md. 43, 472 A.2d 452 (1984); State V. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 439-40,
463,470 A.2d 1269, 1278, 1290-91 (1984); State V. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264-65,
458 A.2d 487, 490 (1983), afJ'd, 299 Md. 72,472 A.2d 472 (1984). See generally
supra note 45 and accompanying text (interplay of prompt trial and speedy trial
provisions).
53. Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 111, 442 A.2d 550, 557 (1982); see, e.g., Mitchell v.
State, 56 Md. App. 162, 178-80,467 A.2d 522,530-31 (1983); Roberts v. State, 53
Md. App. 236, 258, 452 A.2d 1271, 1272 (1982); Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App.
562,573 n.l, 318 A.2d 243, 248 n.l, cert. denied, 272 Md. 742 (1974). See generally
Joseph, supra note 6, at 643-44 (contours of "trial" suggested); infra note 161 and
accompanying text (powers of trial judge in prompt trial context).
54. Guarnera V. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 573 n.l, 318 A.2d 243, 248 n.l, cert. denied,
272 Md. 742 (1974). See generally infra note 161 and accompanying text (powers of
trial judge in prompt trial context).
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right to speedy trial or to due process,55 and any further delay is of concern under prompt trial analysis. 56 As will be discussed later, although
the prompt trial provisions apply to approval of postponement by the
hearing judge to a date within the 180-day period,57 the dismissal penalty
does not, regardless of the existence of good cause. 58
Because the prompt trial provisions are limited by their own terms,
it may be helpful to restate their facial requirements as follows:
1)

a trial date must be assigned within 30 days from appearance of the defendant or his counsel;59
2) the trial must be set for a date within 180 days;60
3) a change of the trial date may be made by the hearing
judge for good cause shown. 61
Under Hicks, dismissal with prejudice is the appropriate penalty for failure to begin the trial within 180 days without good cause or waiver,62 but
there is no prompt trial penalty for an initial failure to assign a trial date
within 30 days.63 There is no prompt trial penalty for postponement
55. State v. Temoney, 45 Md. App. 569, 573,414 A.2d 240, 242 (1980).
56. State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 129,458 A.2d 442,446 (1983), ajJ'd, 299 Md.
32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984). The speedy trial provisions do, however, apply to such
delay. See, e.g., State v. Brookins, 299 Md. 59,472 A.2d 465 (1984); Farinholt v.
State, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264-65,
458 A.2d 487, 490 (1983), ajJ'd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984). See generally
supra notes 17 and 45 and accompanying text (interplay of prompt trial and speedy
trial).
57. E.g., Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 52-53, 472 A.2d 459, 462 (1984); State v.
Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 133,458 A.2d 442, 448 (1983), ajJ'd, 299 Md. 32,472
A.2d 452 (1984). See generally infra Section IV (postponement to date within 180day period); infra Section IV(C) (approval of postponement).
58. E.g., Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 52-53, 472 A.2d 459, 462 (1984); State v.
Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 133,458 A.2d 442, 446, 448 (1983), ajJ'd, 299 Md. 32,
472 A.2d 452 (1984). See infra note 63 and accompanying text (such delay may
have speedy trial implications).
59. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 591(a) (Supp. 1984); Md. R.P. 746(a) (Supp. 1983); MD.
R.P. 4-271(a). See generally infra Section IV (postponement to date within 180-day
period).
60. [d.
61. [d. See generally infra Section IV(B) (good cause for postponement); infra Section
IV(C) (approval of postponement).
62. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 334-35,403 A.2d 356, 360, 369 (1979); see, e.g.,
State v. Armstrong, 46 Md. App. 641, 651,421 A.2d 98, 104 (1980) (state may not
reindict defendant on charges previously dismissed for failure to comply with
prompt trial provisions). See generally infra Section V (waiver of sanction).
"Although more modern speedy trial plans differ in details, certain common characteristics can be identified, including the setting of time limits, provisions for extension of the time limits, and sanctions for failure to comply." Rubine, supra note 31,
at 803.
63. Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 52-53, 472 A.2d 459,462 (1984); State v. Farinholt, 54
Md. App. 124,133,458 A.2d 442,448,449 (1983), ajJ'd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452
(1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 261 n.2, 458 A.2d 487, 488 n.2 (1983),
affd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984). "As long as the trial is begun within the
180-day limit, any delay in its commencement is irrelevant for purposes of the
[prompt trial] rule." Farinholt, 54 Md. App. at 129,458 A.2d at 446. The speedy
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within 180 days regardless of good cause,64 and, therefore, such postponement is permissible.
Unlike the constitutional speedy trial right, the prompt trial provisions do not apply to retrial after remand from an appellate court. 6S
Also, where no trial is contemplated by the parties, as in the taking of a
plea of guilty, the defendant cannot be heard to complain simply because
this was not accomplished within 180 days.66 In other words, " 'a plea of
guilty, effectively accepted, waives all procedural objections, constitutional or otherwise and all non-jurisdictional defects.' "67
Finally, it should be noted that, while the prompt trial provisions
vest the hearing judge with the exclusive power to postpone, "[t]his does
not mean that every request for a postponement of the date set for trial in
a criminal case must be acted upon by the [hearing] judge. "68 The trial
judge may, in his discretion, deny a request for postponement69 but he
may not grant postponement for approval by the hearing judge after the
expiration of the 180 day period. 70

64.
65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

trial provisions, however, do apply, and that delay may be relevant to speedy trial
analysis. Green, 54 Md. App. at 264-65, 458 A.2d at 490. See generally 9 U. BALT.
L. REv. 473, 485-89 (comparison between prompt trial and constitutional speedy
trial requirements); supra note 45 and accompanying text (interplay of prompt trial
and speedy trial); infra Section IV (postponement of trial date); infra Appendix
(prompt trial/speedy trial diagram).
See State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 335,403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979); MD. R.P. 4-271(a).
Coleman v. State, 49 Md. App. 210, 219-20, 431 A.2d 696, 701 (1981); Donalds v.
State, 49 Md. App. 106, 108-09,430 A.2d 113, 115, affd per curiam, 291 Md. 276,
434 A.2d 581 (1981); see State v. Mines, 48 Md. App. 30, 38, 425 A.2d 1044, 1049
(1981), wherein the court stated:
[T]he fact of the matter is that Rule 746 and Art. 27, § 591 do not cover
this situation. The striking of the guilty plea here may be likened to the
grant of a new trial by a trial court or a remand for a new trial by an
appellate court. Neither the rule nor the statute prescribes within what
period the trial shall be had in such circumstances; it is the first bringing of
an accused to trial that is contemplated by both of them.
[d. (dictum); cf. Ward v. State, 52 Md. App. 63, 77-79, 447 A.2d 872, 877-80
(prompt trial right not violated where trial delayed as a result of defendant's attempts to reverse), cert. denied, 294 Md. 546,451 A.2d 657 (1982); Collins v. State,
52 Md. App. 186, 193-95,447 A.2d 1272, 1277 (1982) (180-day rule does not apply
to retrial), affd, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983). The weight of authority is
that a defendant's constitutional right to prompt trial is "revived" by a mistrial.
Joseph, supra note 6, at 633-34.
Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 183,426 A.2d 415, 423 (1981); cf. MD. Crs. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-302(e) (Repl. Vol. 1984) (appeal following guilty plea
by leave of court of special appeals only).
[d. (quoting English v. State, 16 Md. App. 439, 443,298 A.2d 464, 467 (1973». See
generally infra Section V (waiver of prompt trial sanction).
Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 573 n.l, 318 A.2d 243,248 n.l, cert. denied,
272 Md. 742 (1974). See generally infra note 161 (powers of trial judge in prompt
trial litigation).
Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 573 n.l, 318 A.2d 243, 248 n.l, cert. denied,
272 Md. 742 (1974). See generally infra note 161 (powers of trial judge in prompt
trial litigation).
Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1, 472 A.2d 436 (1984). See generally infra note 161
(powers of trial judge in prompt trial litigation).
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Another consideration is the determination of when the rule takes
effect. Revised Maryland Rule 4-271(a) requires that, once a criminal
defendant appears in court, alone or through counsel pursuant to Revised Maryland Rule 4-213, the court has 30 days in which to assign a
trial date for within 180 days of appearance. This determination may be
affected by other factors, such as in a case in which the state enters a
nolle prosequi and the charges are later reinstituted. 71 As a general rule,
"separate charging documents have separate lives and exist independent
of each other."72 But as the court of appeals held in Curley v. State,73
[w]hen a circuit court criminal case is nol prossed, and the state
later has the same charges refiled, the 180 day period for trial
prescribed by [the prompt trial provisions] ordinarily begins to
run with the arraignment or first appearance of defense counsel
under the second prosecution. If, however, it is shown that the
nol pros had the purpose or effect of circumventing the requirements of [the prompt trial provisions], the 180 day period will
commence to run with the arraignment or first appearance of
counsel under the first prosecution. 74
The court held that when a case is nol prossed to circumvent the prompt
trial provisions, and the second prosecution is instituted after the expiration of the 180-day period for the first prosecution, the time period begins
for the second prosecution to run on the same date as it had for the first
prosecution. 7s The period begins to run on commencement of the second
presecution, however, if the case has been nol prossed merely for the
purpose of correcting a substantive error in the document. 76 Along similar lines, when a charging document is dismissed on motion by the defendant for substantive deficiencies, and a new document is filed before
the original expiration date, the court has held that the period begins to
run on the second prosecution. 77
IV.

POSTPONEMENT OF TRIAL DATE

Any party78 seeking to postpone a criminal case in a circuit court to
a date either within or beyond the 180-day period must satisfy the following three conditions: 79 (1) request postponement from the hearing
71. See MD. R.P. 4-247.
72. State v. Phillips, 299 Md. 468, 470, 474 A.2d 512, 513 (1984).
73. 299 Md. 449, 474 A.2d 502 (1984).
74. Id. at 462, 474 A.2d at 508.
75.Id.
76. State v. Glenn, 299 Md. 464, 474 A.2d 509 (1984).
77. State v. Phillips, 299 Md. 468, 474 A.2d 512 (1984).
78. "The mere use of the word 'party' in [the prompt trial provisions] does not preclude
a motion by the court sua sponte as long as the requisite cause and action by the
administrative judge are present." Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 110,442 A.2d 550,
557 (1982) (decided under former Md. R.P. 746 (Supp. 1983»; see MD. R.P. 4-271
(trial court may move for postponement).
79. These steps were outlined in Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 112, 442 A.2d 550, 558
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judge;80 (2) show good cause for the postponement;81 (3) gain approval of
the postponement from the hearing judge. 82 There is no prompt trial
penalty for failure to satisfy these conditions when securing a postponement within the ISO-day period. 83 Because unjustified delay caused by
rescheduling a trial date may cause constitutional speedy trial problems84
and prompt trial problems,85 every effort should be made to postpone to
within a reasonable time, preferably within the ISO-day period. Similarly, although the prompt trial provisions do not apply once trial is begun within the ISO-day period, any continuance must be justified as an
exercise of sound discretion and must withstand constitutional speedy
trial scrutiny.86 As a caveat, regardless of whether these conditions are
satisfied, a defendant may waive his right to the prompt trial penalty
personally or through counsel. 87

A.

Request for Postponement of Trial
A request for postponement of the trial date is a form of motion88

80.
81.
82.
83.

84.

85.
86.
87.
88.

(1982). See State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 129, 134-35,458 A.2d 442,44648, (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). Although Goins speaks of these
conditions as necessary to gain postponement beyond the 18O-day period, the court
of special appeals noted in Farinholt that "[t]he one seeking postponement [within
180-days] must still comply with section b of the Rule and establish good cause for
the postponement before the administrative judge or his designee." Farinholt, 54
Md. App. at 133, 458 A.2d at 448. Logically, it should make no difference since
swift and effective justice is the ultimate social and legal goal, and "[o]ne of the
purposes of [the prompt trial provisions] is to give the county administrative judge
control over the administration of dockets." State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264,
458 A.2d 487, 490 (1983) (citing Hicks v. State, 285 Md. 310,403 A.2d 356 (1979»,
affd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984).
See infra Section IV(B) (request for postponement).
See infra Section IV(B) (good cause for postponement).
See infra Section IV(B) (approval of postponement).
See, e.g., Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 52-53, 472 A.2d 459, 462 (1984); State v.
Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 261 n.2, 458 A.2d 487, 488 n.2 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 72,
472 A.2d 472 (1984). "When postponements are granted from one date within the
180-day period to another date also within the 180-day period, the Hicks sanction of
dismissal under Rule 746a is inapplicable. . . . The dismissal sanction authorized
by Hicks for a violation of Rule 746. . . applies only when a postponement causes a
trial to be continued to a date beyond the 18O-day limit without good cause." State
v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 133,458 A.2d 442,448 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,
472 A.2d 452 (1984).
See, e.g., Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 232, 458 A.2d 480,486 (1983), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984). See
generally supra notes 17 and 45 and accompanying text (interplay of prompt trial
and speedy trial rights).
State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 446-48, 470 A.2d 1269, 1282-83 (1984); State v.
Brown, 61 Md. App. 411, 486 A.2d 813 (1985).
See supra note 83.
See infra Section V (waiver of prompt trial sanction).
Compare Md. R.P. 736(c) (1977) ("other motions" must be "filed") and MD. R.P.
4-252(b) with Md. R.P. 746(b) (Supp. 1983) (request for postponement may be made
"[u]pon motion of a party made in writing or in open court") and MD. R.P. 4271(a) (change of trial date on motion of party or court). Clearly, Md. R.P. 746 and
MD. R.P. 4-271 are self-governing.
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that may be made by the state,89 the defendant,90 a codefendant,91 or the
trial court. 92 Although the request may be oral,93 the better practice is to
make the request and the reasons therefore in writing94 so that they
become a part of the record. 9S Although the request should be express
and articulate,96 it may be made "by the requesting party's seeking some
type of relief which by necessity requires the granting of a postponement
"97

89. E.g., State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 319, 403 A.2d 356, 360-61 (1979); Calhoun v.
State, 52 Md. App. 515, 522,451 A.2d 146, 149 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 299
Md. 1, 472 A.2d 436 (1984); MD. R.P. 4-271(a).
90. E.g., Monge v. State, 55 Md. App. 72, 79-80, 461 A.2d 21, 26 (1983), cert. denied,
298 Md. 708,473 A.2d 458 (1984); State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134,458
A.2d 442, 449 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984); Meyer v. State, 49
Md. App. 300, 301,431 A.2d 738, 740-41, cert. denied, 291 Md. 782 (1981).
91. McFadden v. State, 299 Md. 55, 58,472 A.2d 463,465 (1984) (per curiam); Satchell
v. State, 299 Md. 42, 46, 472 A.2d 457, 459 (1984).
92. E.g., Morgan v. State, 299 Md. 480, 488, 474 A.2d 517, 522 (1984); Goins v. State,
48 Md. App. 115, 117-18,425 A.2d 1374, 1378 (1981) (trial date implicitly extended
by extension of time to file report), affd, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982); see
Howell v. State, 293 Md. 232, 242, 443 A.2d 103, 108 (1982) (dictum) (trial court
could have obtained postponement); see also Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 110, 442
A.2d 550, 557 (1982) (hearing judge may be "party" under prompt trial provisions);
MD. R.? 4-271(a).
93. See, e.g., Rash v. State, 299 Md. 68, 71, 472 A.2d 470, 471 (1984); Pennington v.
State, 299 Md. 23, 28, 472 A.2d 447,449 (1984); Carey v. State, 299 Md. 17,21,472
A.2d 444, 446 (1984); State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134,458 A.2d 442, 449
(1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984).
94. See State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134 n.6, 458 A.2d 442, 449 n.6, affd, 299
Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). Although the prompt trial provisions do not incorporate a demand requirement, a defendant, as an act of good faith, may file a "motion
to compel compliance with the 180-day rule." Pennington v. State, 53 Md. App.
538, 544, 454 A.2d 879, 882 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 299 Md. 23, 472 A.2d
447 (1984). A motion for speedy trial or for prompt trial without a properly filed
motion to dismiss for lack of speedy or prompt trial, however, ordinarily waives
appellate review of the speedy or prompt trial issue. See Md. R.P. 1085 (1977)
(scope of review of court of special appeals); Md. R.P. 885 (1977) (scope of review
of court of appeals); see also Pennington v. State, 53 Md. App. 538, 540 n.l, 454
A.2d 879, 881 n.l (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 299 Md. 23, 472 A.2d 447 (1984)
(waiver of speedy trial issue).
95. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 288 Md. 216, 221, 421 A.2d 69,72 (1980) (record showed
sufficient request); Meyer v. State, 49 Md. App. 300, 301-02, 431 A.2d 738, 739,
cert. denied, 291 Md. 782 (1981) (letter expressing dissatisfaction with counsel made
part of record). See generally infra note 183 and accompanying text (preserving
request on record).
96. State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134 n.6, 458 A.2d 442,449 n.6 (1983), affd,
299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). See generally infra note 183 and accompanying
text (preserving request on record).
97. State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134,458 A.2d 442,449 (1983), affd, 299 Md.
32,472 A.2d 452 (1984); see, e.g., Morgan v. State, 299 Md. 480, 474 A.2d 517
(1984) (motion to suppress); Carey v. State, 299 Md. 17,472 A.2d 444 (1984) (order
for psychiatric examination); State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318-19, 403 A.2d 356,
360-61 (1979) (excusable inability by state to deliver defendant on trial date); Monge
v. State, 55 Md. App. 72, 79-80, 461 A.2d 21, 26 (1983) (request by defendant for
delay in electing mode of trial), cert. denied, 298 Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 (1984);
Briscoe V. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 182-83,426 A.2d 415,422-23 (1981) (request for
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For example, in Monge v. State,98 a motion by the defendant for an
extension of time "to file an election of court or jury trial until his return
from Perkins" was held to amount to "seeking or expressly consenting to
a violation of [the prompt trial provisions]."99 Similarly, in State v.
Hicks,IOO the court of appeals held that the prosecutor's representation to
the hearing judge that the defendant was incarcerated in another jurisdiction and could not be back in the state for trial until the next month was
"tantamount" to having requested a postponement. 101 In Goins v.
State,102 the trial judge was held to have granted a postponement on his
own motion, for the purposes of the prompt trial provisions, when he
gave Clifton T. Perkins Hospital extra time in which to evaluate a defendant,103 and in Carey v. State,l04 an order by the county administrative judge for the defendant's mental exam was held to be a sua sponte
postponement. lOS
B.

Good Cause for Postponement

At the heart of the prompt trial provisions lies the condition that
postponement of trial date be granted only for good cause shown. 106 According to the court of appeals in Hicks, "[d]etennining what constitutes
'[good] cause' under [the prompt trial provisions] is, of course, dependent
upon the facts and circumstances of each case." 107 Because the prompt
provisions were enacted "to protect the societal interest in the prompt
trial of criminal cases . . . ,"108 the term "good cause" is simply a measuring device lO9 used to achieve this goal. I 10
Although the prompt trial provisions remove the discretionary
power to postpone from the trial judge and vest it in the hearing judge, III
the essential criteria for postponement remain the same. 112 What began

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

109.
110.
Ill.
112.

removal); Goins v. State, 48 Md. App. 115, 121,425 A.2d 1374, 1378 (1981), affd,
293 Md. 97, 110-12,442 A.2d 550, 557-58 (1982) (request of psychiatric hospital for
extra time to evaluate defendant). Cf infra Section V (waiver of prompt trial penalty). See generally Joseph, supra note 6, at 627-29 (consent/waiver).
55 Md. App. 72, 461 A.2d 21 (1983).
Id. at 79-80, 461 A.2d at 26.
285 Md. 310,403 A.2d 356 (1979).
Id. at 318-19, 403 A.2d at 360-61.
48 Md. App. 115, 425 A.2d 1374 (1981), affd, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982).
Id. at 121,425 A.2d at 1378.
299 Md. 17,472 A.2d 444 (1984).
Id. at 21-22, 472 A.2d at 447.
MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 591(a) (Supp. 1984); MD. R.P. 4-271(a); Md. R.P. 746
(Supp. 1983).
State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 319,403 A.2d 356, 361 (1979) (footnote omitted).
Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 227, 458 A.2d 480, 483 (1983), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984).
Id. at 229, 458 A.2d at 484.
Id. passim; State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 315-20,403 A.2d 356, 359-61 (1979) (extraordinary cause); Note, supra note 34, at 477-79 (1980) (extraordinary cause).
See MD. R.P. 4-271; Md. R.P. 746 (Supp. 1983); see also State v. Frazier, 298 Md.
422, 449-54, 470 A.2d 1269, 1283-86 (1984).
State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 265, 458 A.2d 487, 490 (good cause), affd, 299
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as a test of "ordinary discretion," 113 became one of "extraordinary
cause,"114 and is now one of "good cause."115 "The change to 'good
cause' may affect the balance, but does not change the essential requirement that the need to postpone outweigh the detriment to the public
interest."116 The result is a private need/public interest test, which provides that good cause exists "if the moving party, including the court, has
exercised reasonable diligence in trying to avoid the need to postpone and
the need to postpone outweighs the detriment to the public interest from
delay."117 This is essentially a balancing test that must be employed by
the hearing judge,118 and generally, the hearing judge may not be overruled by the trial judge 119 or an appellate court 120 absent a clear showing
of abuse of discretion. 121
It should be noted that, because the former test was more demanding, those cases decided before the change to good cause that found "extraordinary cause" for postponement will only be persuasive under the
new standard. 122 Similarly, although the ISO-day period under prompt
trial analysis is not meant to be the measure of the "length of the delay"

113.
114.

115.
116.

117.
118.

119.

120.
121.
122.

Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984); Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 572-73, 318
A.2d 243, 248 (extraordinary cause), cert. denied, 272 Md. 742 (1974). See generally infra Section IV(B) (approval of postponement).
See Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 227, 458 A.2d 480,483 (1983), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 574 (1984) (prompt trial
provisions strip trial judges of discretionary power to postpone).
E.g., State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310,403 A.2d 356 (1979); Copeland v. State, 27 Md.
App. 397, 340 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 276 Md. 740, 750 (1975); Bethea v. State, 26
Md. App. 398, 338 A.2d 390 (1975); Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 318 A.2d
243, cert. denied, 272 Md. 742 (1974). These cases remain persuasive. See State v.
Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 132 n.4, 458 A.2d 442, 448 n.4 (1983), affd, 299 Md.
32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984). See generally supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text
(development of prompt trial provisions).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1984); MD. R.P. 4-271(a); Md. R.P. 746(b)
(Supp. 1983). See generally supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text (development
of prompt trial provisions).
Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 230, 458 A.2d 480, 485 (1983), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984).
Carter, 54 Md. App. at 229, 458 A.2d at 484.
Id.; see also Guarnera v. State, 20 Md. App. 562, 574, 318 A.2d 243, 249 (preHicks; delay must be unforeseen and unintentional), cert. denied, 272 Md. 742
(1974); c/ State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264, 458 A.2d 487, 490, affd, 299 Md.
72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984) (speedy trial balancing test inapplicable to prompt trial).
State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 488, 474 A.2d 514, 517 (1984); State v. Frazier, 298
Md. 422, 448-54, 470 A.2d 1269, 1283-86 (1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260,
265-67, 458 A.2d 487, 490-91, affd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984); see infra
Section IV(B) (approval of postponement).
See State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 450-52, 470 A.2d 1269, 1284-85 (1984); State v.
Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 266-67, 458 A.2d 487,491, affd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d
472 (1984).
See State v. Beard, 299 Md. 272, 280, 474 A.2d 514, 517 (1984); State v. Frazier,
298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 266-68,458
A.2d 487, 490-92, affd, 299 Md. 72,472 A.2d 472 (1984).
State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 132 n.4, 458 A.2d 442, 448 n.4 (1983), affd,
299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984).
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factor in constitutional speedy trial litigation,123 the "reason for delay"
factor under constitutional speedy trial analysis may be helpful in determining what constitutes good cause in prompt trial litigation. 124
The Maryland appellate court decisions to date offer some specific
but non-definitive examples of good cause shown, and many of these involve pretrial preparation or motions. For example, a delay in receiving
an evaluation concerning the defendant's mental health was held to be
good cause for postponement. 12S Although a defendant's need for postponement to secure counsel may be good cause,126 timing is extremely
important. 127 Thus, in one case, an eleventh hour request to change
counsel was not good cause,128 and, in another case, the defendant's insistence, on the date of trial, that appointed counsel was unprepared was
not extraordinary cause. 129 The need by a defendant to visit a sick relative on the day of trial was also found not to constitute good cause. 130
When a defendant backed out of a plea agreement on the day of
trial, stating that he "wanted a jury trial and 'wanted it today,' " there
was good cause for the state to seek postponement long enough to summon witnesses and to otherwise prepare for a trial on the merits.131
Good cause was also found when a late motion for severance was granted
at a point when only one defendant could be tried on schedule,132 when
time was taken up on a pretrial suppression motion,133 and when good
cause was found on request for postponement by a codefendant. 134
Moreover, extraordinary cause may exist where removal is granted and
123. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 320,403 A.2d 356, 361-62 (1979). But see supra note
17 and accompanying text (180 days used as benchmark under speedy trial
analysis).
124. See R. GILBERT & C. MOYLAN, JR., MARYLAND CRIMINAL LAW: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 42.0-48.3 (1983); Comment, supra note 45, at 47. In any event, it is
best to put on some evidence regarding good cause, later to be held ordinary by the
hearing judge, than to rely on a silent record. Loker, supra note 28, at 32.
125. Goins v. State, 48 Md. App. 115, 121,425 A.2d 1374, 1378 (1981), affd, 293 Md.
97, 110,442 A.2d 550, 557 (1982); see also Carey v. State, 299 Md. 17,472 A.2d 444
(1984) (order for psychiatric evaluation).
126. See Satchell v. State, 54 Md. App. 333, 338-40, 458A.2d 853, 856-57 (1983), affd,
299 Md. 42, 472 A.2d 457 (1984). See generally Joseph, supra note 6, at 626 (factors to be considered where delay producing conduct constitutionally protected).
127. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 43 Md. App. 698, 703-04, 407 A.2d 330, 334-35 (1979),
rev'd on other grounds, 288 Md. 216, 421 A.2d 69 (1980).
128. Meyer v. State, 49 Md. App. 300, 304, 431 A.2d 738, 740-41, cert. denied, 291 Md.
782 (1981).
129. State V. Temoney, 45 Md. App. 569, 572-74,414 A.2d 240,241-42 (1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 290 Md. 251,429 A.2d 1018 (1981).
130. Brown V. State, 50 Md. App. 651, 653-54, 441 A.2d 354, 356 (1982).
131. State V. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 267-68, 458 A.2d 491-92, affd, 299 Md. 79, 472
A.2d 472 (1984).
132. Calhoun V. State, 52 Md. App. 515, 522,451 A.2d 146, 149-50 (1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 249 Md. 1, 472 A.2d 436 (1984); see also STANDARDS RELATING TO
SPEEDY TRIAL, standard 2.3(g) (severance as cause) (approved draft 1968), reprinted in Rubine, supra note 31, at 810 n.75.
133. State V. Harris, 299 Md. 63, 472 A.2d 467 (1984).
134. McFadden V. State, 299 Md. 55, 472 A.2d 463 (1984).
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the case cannot begin within the ISO-day period. 13S
Similar examples of good cause appear in the literature. 136 For example, the parties involvement in bona fide plea bargaining would be
good cause for postponement on behalf of the state. 137 The same would
be true when the defendant fails to comply with valid discovery requests. 138 Also, because it is within prosecutorial discretion to try one
codefendant before the other, good cause would exist to postpone the
trial of the codefendant provided that there is good cause for severing the
joint trial. 139 Postponement would also be justified when a defendant is
deemed incompetent to stand trial. 140
Another recurring fact pattern concerns the absence of key witnesses or other competent evidence. The criteria for determining
whether to postpone trial on this basis, under constitutional speedy trial
. analysis prior to State v. Hicks,141 are identical to those applied under
state prompt trial analysis. 142 These criteria are: (I) a reasonable expectation of securing the witness or other evidence within a reasonable time;
(2) the competency and materiality of the proffered evidence; (3) the ability to fairly try the case without the evidence; (4) the exercise of reasonable diligence by the moving party prior to the trial date. 143 The same
criteria would apply to a timely request for postponement because of the
necessary convalescence ·of an injured victim or witness l44 or their unavailability due to prescheduled vacation. 145 The unexcused failure of a
party to secure the attendance of a material witness, however, would not
constitute good cause because the public interest in prompt trial out135. Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 182-83,426 A.2d 415, 422 (1981) (dictum).
136. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note 127, standard 2.3.
137. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 633.
138. Id. at 635.
139. Id. at 637.
140. Id. at 639; see also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note
127, standard 2.3(a) (lack of competency as cause).
141. 285 Md. 310,403 A.2d 356 (1979).
142. Compare Bolden v. State, 44 Md. App. 643, 655-56,410 A.2d 1085, 1093-94 (preHicks), cert. denied, 287 Md. 750 (1980) with State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124,
132,458 A.2d 442,449 (1983) (post-Hicks), aird on other grounds, 299 Md. 32,472
A.2d 452 (1984). Note, however, that Bolden satisfied the extraordinary cause condition and the Farinholt good cause condition. See supra text accompanying note
122 (cases finding extraordinary cause remain persuasive).
143. See State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134, 458 A.2d 442, 449 (1983), aird on
other grounds, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984); Bolden v. State, 44 Md. App. 643,
655, 410 A.2d 1085, 1093-94 (extraordinary cause), cert. denied, 287 Md. 750
(1980); Bethea V. State, 26 Md. App. 398, 400, 338 A.2d 390, 392 (1975) (extraordinary cause); see also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note
127, standard 2.3(d)(i) (absence of material evidence).
144. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 636, 640.
145. See State V. Farinholt, 54 Md. App 124, 128,458 A.2d 442, 446 (1983) (vacationing
witnesses' absence due to no fault of requesting party constitutes good cause), aird
on other grounds, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984).
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weighs the need for such postponement. 146 Newly discovered evidence,
however, may constitute good cause. 147
Another source of litigation concerns whether the unavailability of
judicial resources on the date of trial constitutes good cause for postponement. 148 Because the public interest is key to this issue, a substantial
showing is required to support postponement. At first, the court of special appeals was sympathethic only to "unavoidable" delays in the judicial machinery where the reasons were supported by the record. 149 The
court of appeals intervened, however, and held in State v. Fraizer,lso that
an overcrowded docket situation does not, as a matter of law, preclude a
change of trial date and may even justify a lengthy postponement. 151
"When the [hearing judge] postpones a case beyond the ISO-day deadline
because of court unavailability, there is a violation of [the prompt trial
provisions] only if it is demonstrated that the change of trial date, or the
period of time until a new trial date, represented a clear abuse of discretion."lS2 The court cited with approval cases from other jurisdictions
that held non-chronic court congestion to be good cause for postpone146. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 640; see also supra text accompanying notes 116-21
(private need/public interest test for good cause under prompt trial provisions).
147. Morgan v. State, 299 Md. 480, 488, 474 A.2d 517, 521-22 (1984).
148. E.g., State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422 passim, 470 A.2d 1269 passim, (1984); Larsen v.
State, 55 Md. App. 135, 145-49,461 A.2d 543, 458-60 (1983), cerr. denied, 298 Md.
708,473 A.2d 458 (1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 268-69, 458 A.2d 487,
492 (1983) (dictum), affd, 299 Md. 72,472 A.2d 472 (1984). See generally ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note 127, standard 2.3(b) (lack
of judicial resources must be due to exceptional circumstances to be excused);
Poulous & Coleman, Speedy Trial, Slow Implementation: The ABA Standards in
Search of a Statehouse, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 357, 374-76 (1976); Rubine, supra note
31, at 810 n.75; Comment, Speedy Trial & the Congested Trial Calendar, 1972
UTAH L. REv. 268, 272-74 (1972).
149. Compare Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 146-49, 461 A.2d 543, 548-50 (1983)
(good cause shown on record), cerro denied, 298 Md. 708,473 A.2d 458 (1984) with
Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 232-34, 458 A.2d 480, 486-87 (1983) (record
insufficient; good cause finding reversed), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v.
Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984). But cf Wilson v. State, 44 Md. App. I,
ll., 408 A.2d 102, 109 (1979) (constitutional speedy trial case in which delay caused
by crowded docket charged against state), cert. denied, 286 Md. 755, cert. denied,
446 U.S. 921 (1980).
150. 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984).
lSI. Id. at 461-62, 470 A.2d at 1289-90.
152. Id.; see also State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472,474 A.2d 514 (1984) (dismissal denied on
appeal because of failure of defendants to show abuse of discretion by trial judge in
postponing beyond 180 days); Mahammitt v. State, 299 Md. 82, 472 A.2d 477
(1984) (remanded to trial court for receipt of evidence on issue of waiver); Harper v.
State, 299 Md. 75, 472 A.2d 473 (1984) (no abuse of discretion by trial judge for
postponement to 2 days beyond 18O-day period due to unavailability of a court);
Rash v. State, 299 Md. 68, 472 A.2d 470 (1984) (administrative judge did not abuse
discretion by postponing beyond 18O-day period because of overcrowded docket);
McFadden v. State, 299 Md. 55, 472 A.2d 463 (1984) (no abuse of discretion in
requiring defendant to be tried beyond 180-day period when codefendants agreed to
postponement and there was good cause not to sever). But see State v. Brown, 61
Md. App. 411, 486 A.2d 813 (1985) (dismissal affirmed when case postponed to 173
days beyond 180th day).
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ment or delay, while holding chronic court congestion as inexcusable
under their respective state statutes or rules of procedure. IS3 The court
stated:
The defendants' argument, that overcrowded dockets cannot as
a matter of law constitute good cause for the postponement of a
criminal case, is illogical. When overcrowded dockets are due
in part to shortages of judges, prosecuting attorneys, public
defenders, supporting personnel, or facilities, it must be
remembered that public resources are not unlimited and there
are many competing demands upon public funds. Moreover,
even if there were no deficiencies in the number of judges, prosecutors, public defenders, etc., overcrowded docket situations
are sometimes inescapable. As earlier explained, the nature of
any reasonable scheduling system and the inherent lack of certainty concerning the number of cases which will be fully tried
or the length of trials, will on occasions lead to overcrowded
dockets. IS4
In deciding whether court congestion constitutes good cause, it is
the duty of the state and the hearing judge to present as much evidence
as possible with the request for postponement, "such as live witnesses
and court records, as opposed to mere stipulated proffers or argument."ISS Thus, "[w]here the cause for postponement is the unavailability of a judge, a jury or a courtroom, it might be well in the future for the
state to have put into the record actual copies of this trial schedule, along
with as much supporting detail as possible indicating the efforts being
made by the court and the State's Attorney's Office to comply with [the
prompt trial provisions]."ls6
Like the early decisions of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,ls7 some other persuasive commentators place a premium on the
interest of the public in prompt and effective trial when the issue is
whether lack of judicial resources is good cause for postponement. ISS
The American Bar Association Speedy Trial Guidelines are the least
sympathetic, however, prescribing postponement for "exceptional circumstances" only, such as "a large scale riot or other mass public
153.
154.
155.
156.

State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 455-57, 470 A.2d 1269, 1287 (1984).
Id. at 457, 470 A.2d at 1287.
Loker, supra note 28, at 32.
Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 149,461 A.2d 543, 550 (1983), cert. denied, 298
Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 (1984).
157. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text (private need/public interest test for
good cause under prompt trial provisions).
158. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note 132, standard
2.3(b) (lack of judicial resources must be due to exceptional circumstances); Comment, supra note 148, at 272-74 (lack of judicial resources must be due to exceptional circumstances).
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disorder. "159
From the preceeding illustrations, it is apparent that good cause depends "on the facts and circumstances of each case"l60 and turns on the
moving party's need for postponement weighed against the public interest in swift and effective justice. 161

C

Approval of Postponement

Once the hearing judge properly exercises the discretionary power
vested in him by the prompt trial provisions and postpones the trial date
beyond the 180-day limit, or once the trial begins within the l80-day
period, the prompt trial provisions are no longer applicable;162 however,
the defendant's rights are still guaranteed by the constitutional speedy
trial provisions. 163 The trial judge may approve successive postponements beyond the 180-day period, albeit at the risk of offending the constitutional speedy trial guarantee. l64
Once the prompt trial provisions no longer apply, the public interest
in swift justice and the sixth amendment require that postponements be
granted only for the length of time necessary to alleviate the good cause
shown. 165 Thus, "[i]n granting a postponement to a date beyond 180
days, 'the administrative judge (as well as the prosecutor) is administratively responsible for seeing that a [postponement], even when justified in
purpose, is not extended unnecessarily' for purposes of a Barker v. Wingo
159. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note 132, standard 2.3(b)
and accompanying comments.
160. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 319, 403 A.2d 356, 361 (1979).
161. E.g., State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 449-63, 470 A.2d 1269, 1283-90 (1984) (nonchronic congestion does not preclude finding of good cause); Carter v. State, 54 Md.
App. 220, 229-32, 458 A.2d 480, 484-86 (1983) (good cause requires extenuating
circumstances and reasonable diligence), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v.
Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984) (defense bears burden of proving abuse of
discretion in granting good cause postponement); see also supra notes 116-21 and
accompanying text (private need/public interest test for good cause under prompt
trial provisions).
162. State v. Harris, 299 Md. 63,472 A.2d 467 (1984); Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 472
A.2d 459 (1984); Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984); State v.
Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984); Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 111-12,
442 A.2d 550, 557-58 (1982); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264-65, 458 A.2d
487,490 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 72,472 A.2d 472 (1984). See generally supra note
45; infra Appendix (interplay between prompt trial and speedy trial analyses).
163. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 299 Md. 63, 472 A.2d 467 (1984); Grant v. State, 299 Md.
47,472 A.2d 459 (1984); Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984); State
v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260,
264-65, 458 A.2d 487, 490 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984). See
generally supra note 45; infra Appendix (interplay between prompt trial and speedy
trial analyses).
164. See State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 129-30,458 A.2d 442, 446-47 (1983), affd,
299 Md. 32,40-41,472 A.2d 452,456 (1984). See generally supra note 45 (federal &
state constitutional speedy trial rights); infra Appendix (interplay between prompt
trial and speedy trial analyses).
165. Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984). See generally supra note 45
(interplay between prompt trial and speedy trial analyses).
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speedy trial analysis."166 As a result, it is incumbent on the hearing
judge to attempt to make postponements to a date within the ISO-day
period, or to state on the record his reasons for not doing SO.167 In deciding the length of a postponement, the hearing judge should consider the
purpose the postponement would serve to the moving party and the public interest in swift justice. 168
It is imperative that a postponement beyond the ISO-day period be
granted by the county administrative judge or his designee only. As the
court of appeals stated in State v. Frazier :169
The major safeguard contemplated by the statute and rule. . .
is the requirement that the administrative judge or his designee,
rather than any judge, order the postponement. This is a logical safeguard, as it is the administrative judge who is responsible 'for the administration of the court,' who assigns trial
judges, who 'supervises the assignment of actions for trial,' who
supervises the court personnel involved in the assignment of
cases, and who receives reports from such personne1. 170
The court added a cautionary note in Farinholt v. State,171 however, that
"any procedure adopted by a circuit court consisting of several trial
judges, by which all trial judges are purportedly authorized to grant postponements for purposes of [the prompt trial provisions], would not
comply." 172
Unlike a motion to dismiss, which will be discussed later, there is no
formal or required method to secure postponement. 173 The Maryland
courts, however, "have always required some record of proceedings of an
administrative nature before they will reverse an exercise of judicial dis166. State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 133 n.5, 458 A.2d 442,449 n.5 (1983) (quoting
Chance v. State, 45 Md. App. 521, 526,414 A.2d 535, 537 (1980», affd, 299 Md.
32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). See generally Joseph, supra note 6, at 631 (trial date must
not be postponed unnecessarily even when prompt trial sanction is waived); supra
note 45 (interplay between prompt trial and speedy trial analyses).
167. Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 232, 458 A.2d 480, 486 (1983), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472,474 A.2d 514 (1984). See generally
infra notes 173-87 and accompanying text (preserving the record).
168. See Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 227, 458 A.2d 480, 484 (1983) (quoting ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, supra note 132, standards 12 and 13),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984).
169. 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984).
170. Id. at 453-54, 470 A.2d at 1285 (footnotes omitted).
171. 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1983).
172. Id. at 37-38 n.2, 472 A.2d at 454 n.2.
173. See, e.g., id. at 32 n.l, 472 A.2d at 453 n.l; State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318-19,403
A.2d 356, 360-61 (1979); Goins v. State, 48 Md. App. 115, 118-19,425 A.2d 1374,
1376-77 (1981), affd, 293 Md. 97, 111-12,442 A.2d 550, 558 (1982). But see State
v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134 n.6, 458 A.2d 442,449 n.6 (1983) (request for
postponement should be in writing), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). Approval may also be made sua sponte by the hearing judge. Goins v. State, 48 Md.
App. 115, 118-19,425 A.2d 1374, 1376-77 (1979), affd, 293 Md. 97,442 A.2d 550
(1982).
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cretion, and of late more and more clarity and detail is prescribed."174
Although approval may be granted informally, orders of postponement
should be on the record and explicitly state the reasons therefor. 17S Postponements made in chambers should also be recorded stenographically.176 Counsel should note with caution that a defendant, who may
have more personal knowledge of the need for postponement than counsel, may have a nonconstitutional right under the prompt trial provisions
to be present during the motions hearing. 177 Postponement may be
granted sua sponte, without request, hearing, or order of approval.l'8
Although the trial judge plays a backstage role under the prompt trial
provisions,179 he may not postpone a trial date beyond the ISO-day period subject to later approval by the administrative judge, at least when
such approval takes place after the expiration date. 180
As to burden of proof, the prompt trial provisions require that good
cause of postponement be shown 181 by the requesting party, who "bears
the burden of demonstrating to the administrative judge or his designee
that [the prompt trial] requirements are satisfied."182 As one commentator has noted, "[e]stablishing an adequate record means producing competent evidence, such as live witnesses and court records, as opposed to
mere unstipulated proffers or argument. . . . [Counsel] cannot afford
to articulate arguments for or against a [postponement] in the judge's
chambers, and forget to repeat their performance on the record."183
174. Hughes v. State, 43 Md. App. 698, 706, 407 A.2d 330, 335 (1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 288 Md. 216,421 A.2d 69 (1980).
175. See State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 134 n.6, 458 A.2d 442, 449 n.6 (1983),
ajJ'd, 299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984).
176. State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 265 n.5, 458 A.2d 487, 490 n.5, ajJ'd, 299 Md. 72,
472 A.2d 472 (1984). See generally infra note 183 and accompanying text (preserving the record).
177. Hughes v. State, 288 Md. 216, 227-29, 421 A.2d 69, 75-76 (1980).
178. Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97, 110-12, 442 A.2d 550, 557-58 (1982).
179. State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 448-54, 470 A.2d 1269, 1283-86 (1984); see supra note
161 and accompanying text (powers of trial judge in prompt trial context).
180. Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1,472 A.2d 436 (1984).
181. Carter v. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 233, 458 A.2d 480, 486 (1983), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984).
182. Id. at 231, 458 A.2d at 485.
183. Loker, supra note 28, at 32. A complete record is also important to defense attorneys. Accordingly, the court of special appeals has remarked that
[s]ince what constitutes [good] cause is a question within the limited discretion of an administrative judge to be decided on a case by case basis
. . . it is appellant's burden to provide us with a satisfactorily endowed
record indicative of an abuse of that discretion.
Hughes v. State, 43 Md. App. 698, 707, 407 A.2d 330, 336 (1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 288 Md. 216,421 A.2d 69 (1980). But see Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App.
135,461 A.2d 543 (1983) (postponement due to lack of judicial resources upheld),
cert. denied, 298 Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 (1984). In Larsen the court of special
appeals stated that
[w]here the cause for postponement is the unavailability of a judge, a jury
or a court room, it might be well in the future for the State to have put
into the record actual copies of the trial schedule, along with as much
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Finally, it should be noted that the mere failure by a defendant to
object to the state's request for postponement does not, as a matter of
law, constitute a waiver of prompt trial protection. 184 In some circumstances, however, it may, and therefore, the defendant has a right to be
present when and where the issue of postponement is discussed,185 even
though such a hearing is not a "critical stage" requiring his presence. 186
As both defense counsel and prosecuting attorneys have learned, the
need to preserve the record for appellate review is crucial. 187 A good
example is Hughes v. State,188 in which the defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that he was not present in the administrative
judge's chambers during the consideration of his request for postponement. The court of special appeals stated that
[we] are faced with a practical dilemma in the absence of a record of what transpired in [the administrative judge's] chambers.
We do not know whether [the administrative judge] declined to
have the defendant present for security reasons, or whether his
decision was arbitrary. We do not know what considerations
were left before his honor in determining whether extraordinary cause existed under the "facts and circumstances of this
supporting detail as possible indicating the efforts being made by the court
and the State's Attorney's Office to comply with Maryland Rule 746.
Id. at 149, 461 A.2d at 550. "Appellate courts have always required some record of
proceedings of an administrative nature before they will reverse an exercise of judicial discretion, and oflate more and more clarity and detail is prescribed." Hughes
v. State, 43 Md. App. 698, 706,407 A.2d 330, 335 (1979), rev'd on other grounds,
288 Md. 216,421 A.2d 69 (1980). Therefore, even proceedings in the chambers of
the administrative judge should be recorded. State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 265
n.5, 458 A.2d 487, 490 n.5 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 72, 472 A.2d 472 (1984). Failure
to do so may cause problems on appeal. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 43 Md. App.
698, 702-03, 407 A.2d 330, 334 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 288 Md. 216, 421
A.2d 69 (1980).
In a few cases, however, the court of appeals remanded for full evidentiary
hearings under former Md. R.P. 871 (1977) to give the parties the benefit of the
court's teachings in State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984) and
Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). E.g., Mahammitt v. State, 299
Md. 82, 472 A.2d 477 (1984); Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 472 A.2d 459 (1984);
Pennington v. State, 299 Md. 23,472 A.2d 447 (1984). See generally infra Section
V(B) (approval of postponement). The court in Frazier and Farinholt placed a
heavy burden of proof upon the party challenging a good cause finding on a motion
to dismiss. See infra Section VI (motion to dismiss).
184. See, e.g., Rash v. State, 299 Md. 68,70-71,472 A.2d 470,471 (1984); State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 447 n.17, 470 A.2d 1269, 1282 n.17 (1984); Borgen v. State, 58
Md. App. 61, 70, 472 A.2d 114, 118-19 (1984); Miller v. State, 53 Md. App. I, 6,
452 A.2d 180, 183 (1982), cerL denied, 295 Md. 302 (1983); State v. Lattisaw, 48
Md. App. 20,27-29,425 A.2d 1051, 1054-55, cert. denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981). See
generally infra Section V (waiver of prompt trial penalty).
185. See Hughes v. State, 288 Md. 216, 228-29, 421 A.2d 69, 75-76 (1980).
186. Id. at 224-29, 421 A.2d at 74-76.
187. See generally supra note 183 and accompanying text (preserving the record).
188. 43 Md. App. 698, 407 A.2d 330 (1979), rev'd on other grounds, 288 Md. 216, 421
A.2d 69 (1980).
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case." 189
This decision must be compared with Larsen v. State,190 in which approval of a postponement for lack of judicial resources was upheld because of a carefully developed record that clearly showed good cause. 191
Once good cause is found by the hearing judge and the trial date postponed, the party challenging the postponement must show that a finding
was an abuse of discretion in a motion to dismiss. 192
V.

WAIVER OF PROMPT TRIAL PENALTY

It is the penalty of dismissal that gives the prompt trial provisions
their bite. As a general rule, a defendant's trial must begin within 180
days from appearance;193 if it does not, all related charges must be dismissed with prejudice and forever, 194 and the defendant is absolved of his
crimes. 195
One question left open in Hicks is how and when a defendant may
waive his right to the prompt trial penalty. The court in Hicks intimated
that the waiver should be express, but an express waiver need not be
"knowing and intelligent," as required for the relinquishment of constitutional rightS. 196 The factual context of the few cases dealing with this
issue can be argued to involve both express and implied waiver. For example, prompt trial dismissal is inappropriate where defense counsel inadvertently consents to a trial date beyond the 180-day period. 197
Because, however, there must be good cause shown for the length of the
189. [d. at 702-03, 407 A.2d at 334.
, 190. 55 Md. App. 135, 461 A.2d 543 (1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458
(1984). See generally supra note 183 and accompanying text (preserving the
record).
191. Larsen, 55 Md. App. at 145-59, 461 A.2d at 548-50. See generally supra text accompanying notes 150-60 (lack of judicial resources as good cause).
192. See, e.g., State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 452, 470 A.2d 1269, 1285 (1984). See generally infra Section VI (motion to dismiss).
193. MD. R.P. 4-271(a); Md. R.P. 746(a) (Supp. 1983); see State v. Farinholt, 54 Md.
App. 124, 129, 458 A.2d 442, 448 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984).
194. See State v. Armstrong, 46 Md. App. 641, 651, 421 A.2d 98, 104 (1980) (state may
not reindict defendant on charges previously dismissed due to lack of prompt trial).
195. E.g., Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1,6,472 A.2d 436,439 (1984); see Calhoun v. State,
52 Md. App. 515,451 A.2d 146 (1983), rev'd, 299 Md. 1, 472 A.2d 436 (1984):
[T]he appellant urges that he be absolved of premeditated murder and all
other crimes of which he has been found guilty, not because his constitutional rights were violated, not because he was denied a fair trial, not because there was insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, but
solely because the rubrics of a Court rule were not precisely followed.
[d. at 521, 451 A.2d at 149.
196. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 320, 335, 403 A.2d 356, 361-62, 369 (1979); State v.
Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20,27-29,425 A.2d 1051, 1054-55, cert. denied, 290 Md. 717
(1981). See generally Joseph, supra note 6, at 647; Loker, supra note 28, at 31.
197. State V. Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20,22-23,27,425 A.2d 1051, 1053-54, 1055-56, cert.
denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981); see also State V. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 335,403 A.2d 356,
369 (1979) (defendant or counsel may waive penalty); Williams V. State, SO Md.
App. 255, 267, 437 A.2d 665, 672 (1981) (waiver by agreement of counsel), cert.
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delay between postponement and trial,198 request for postponement by a
defendant 199 or failure by a defendant to otherwise object to postponement200 does not automatically constitute a waiver of prompt trial penalty. But "when a defendant or his attorney, in the latter portion of the
180-day period, seeks the postponement of a previously assigned trial
date, and the newly assigned trial date is beyond 180 days, it could reasonably be concluded that such defendant has sought a trial date in violation of the rule."201 Nor is the defendant entitled to dismissal when he
attempts to indirectly "gain advantage" through his own dilatory devices. 202 Also, if the defendant fails to raise and move for dismissal on
prompt203 or speedy204 trial grounds, appellate review on those issues is
precluded. 20s

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

203.
204.
205.

denied, 292 Md. 639 (1982); Joseph, supra note 6, at 631-32 (waiver by counsel).
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland stated that:
Defense counsel presumably can count to 180 as well as prosecutors;
they know when they entered their appearances-when the clock began to
tick-and they can figure out when the time under the Rule expires.
These were not inexperienced counsel; according to the record, both attorneys had extensive background in the trial of criminal cases and were well
aware of both the Rule and the interpretation given to it in Hicks. They
both agreed to the June 9 date because it was convenient to them and, in
the absence of any contrary indication, we assume was acceptable to their
clients. It is not necessary for the clerk in the criminal assignment office to
inform defense counsel with each telephone call of that which it is their job
to know. Nor does it detract in the least from the reality of their consent
to a particular trial date, or from the "expressness" of it, that they may be
unaware that the date to which they agree is, in fact, beyond the 180-day
period. To require dismissal of an indictment in such a case would be
tantamount to doing precisely what the Court said was inappropriatepermitting "the defendant to gain advantage from a violation of the rule
when he [through counsel] was a party to that violation." (Footnote
omitted)
Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. at 28-29, 425 A.2d at 1055-56.
State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 447-48, 470 A.2d 1269, 1282-83 (1984).
Pennington v. State, 299 Md. 23, 28-29, 472 A.2d 447, 450 (1984); Curley v. State,
299 Md. 449, 452 n.3, 474 A.2d 502, 504 n.3 (1984).
State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 447 n.17, 470 A.2d 1269, 1282 n.17 (1984); Borgen v.
State, 58 Md. App. 61, 71, 472 A.2d 114, 118-19, cert. denied, 300 Md. 483, 479
A.2d 372 (1984).
Pennington v. State, 299 Md. 23, 28-29, 472 A.2d 447, 450 (1984) (dictum).
E.g., Monge v. State, 55 Md. App. 72, 79-80,461 A.2d 21, 26-27 (1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 (1984); State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20, 28-29,
425 A.2d 1051, 1055-56, cert. denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981). See generally Joseph,
supra note 6, at 624-35 (dilatory tactics).
See Pennington v. State, 299 Md. 23, 472 A.2d 447 (1984).
Pennington v. State, 53 Md. App. 538, 540 n.l, 454 A.2d 879, 881 n.l (1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 299 Md. 23, 472 A.2d 447 (1984); Collins v. State, 52 Md. App.
186, 194-95,447 A.2d 1272, 1277 (1982), affd, 296 Md. 670,464 A.2d 1028 (1983).
See Md. R.P. 885 and 1085 (1977) (appellate review); see also Larsen v. State, 55
Md. App. 135, 140, 461 A.2d 543, 545 (1983) (prompt trial issues properly raised
and preserved for appellate review), cert. denied, 298 Md. 708,473 A.2d 458 (1984).
See generally Joseph, supra note 6, at 621 (waiver by failure to move for dismissal);
Loker, supra note 28, at 31 (waiver for failure to move for dismissal); infra Section
VI (motion to dismiss under MD. R.P. 4-252).
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Other examples of prompt trial waiver deal with pretrial motions by
defendants,206 most of which would have also constituted good cause for
postponement when requested by the state or the trial judge. 207 For example, a defendant's motions for severance2°8 and for removaP09 were
both viewed as a waiver of the dismissal penalty because they extended
the trial date beyond the ISO-day period. 210 Similarly, a defendant's motion for an extension of time in which to elect the mode of trial he desired
"was tantamount to seeking or expressly consenting to a violation of [the
prompt trial provisions]."211 In another case, failure by the defense to
object to the state's pretrial motion for postponement based on the availability of new evidence constituted a waiver of the dismissal penalty.212
Other examples in the literature include waiver due to flight or unexcused absence of a defendant213 and refusal by a defendant to waive
extradition. 214
On the other hand, the imposition of an insanity defense may not
constitute an express waiver to the prompt trial penalty.21S Nor does the
defendant's insistence on his sixth amendment right to counsel on the
206. For a discussion of where and when a pretrial motion may constitute waiver under
prompt trial analysis, see Joseph, supra note 6, at 627-29.
207. See Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 182-83, 426 A.2d 415, 422-23 (1981) (dictum); see also MD. R.P. 4-271(a) (power of the trial judge to request postponement).
208. E.g., Calhoun v. State, 52 Md. App. 515, 522, 451 A.2d 146, 150 (1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 299 Md. 1,472 A.2d 436 (1984).
209. E.g., Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 182-83, 426 A.2d 415, 422-23 (1981)
(dictum).
210. Calhoun v. State, 52 Md. App. 515, 521-22, 451 A.2d 146, 148-50, rev'd on other
grounds, 299 Md. 1,472 A.2d 436 (1984); Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 18283,426 A.2d 415, 422-23 (1981).
211. Monge v. State, 55 Md. App. 72, 79-80, 461 A.2d 21, 26 (1983), cert. denied, 298
Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 (1984).
212. See Bolden V. State, 44 Md. App. 643, 656, 410 A.2d 1085, 1093 (dictum), cert.
denied, 287 Md. 758 (1980); see also Miller V. State, 53 Md. App. 1, 6, 452 A.2d
180, 183 (1982) (failure to object), cert. denied, 295 Md. 302 (1983); c/ State V.
Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20, 21, 27, 425 A.2d 1051, 1053-54, 1055-56 (inadvertent
consent to postponement), cert. denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981).
213. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 624-25.
214. Id. at 627. But c/ Harper V. State, 299 Md. 75, 78, 472 A.2d 473, 475 (1984)
(applicability of prompt trial provisions once Interstate Agreement on Detainers is
invoked remains undecided).
215. See Goins V. State, 293 Md. 97. 108.442 A.2d 550, 556 (1982). In Goins. the court
of special appeals found that. although there was a prompt trial provision violation.
dismissal was inappropriate because the delay in obtaining a mental health evaluation was for the defendant's benefit. Id. at 106-07,442 A.2d at 555-56. Although
the court of appeals affirmed on other grounds, it stated that
[b]eing dilatory in raising an insanity defense obviously is not seeking or
expressly consenting to a trial date in violation of § 591 and rule 746. At
best, it might arguably constitute an implied consent to a postponement of
the trial date, depending on the circumstances. However, in order to
avoid such doubts and controversies, Hicks carefully limited this exception
to the situation where the defendant seeks or expressly consents to a trial
date in violation of the rule.
Id. at 108, 442 A.2d at 556.
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day of trial waive his prompt trial rights, or his insistence on the right to
a prompt trial waive his right to counsel.2 16 Similarly, a defendant who
waited 90 days after a postponement to move to dismiss on the day of
trial did not waive his right to the prompt trial dismissal penalty.217
Although delay beyond the ISO-day period due to bona fide plea
negotiations would not constitute a waiver by the defendant,218 it may
constitute good cause for the state to postpone. 219 The acceptance of a
guilty plea, however, "waives all procedural objections, constitutional or
otherwise, and all non-jurisdictional defects."22o Moreover, once a defendant agrees to a plea bargain, "obviat[ing] the need for trial altogether," there is a de facto waiver of the prompt trial penalty, even if the
plea is not consummated within the ISO-day period. 221 A defacto waiver
analysis would apply equally to trial on charges for which the defendant
received probation before judgment that he later violated. 222
There also is some confusion regarding the duty of the state to request postponement when it is difficult to foresee whether a defendant's
dilatory conduct will constitute waiver, and there is no reason to believe
that he will make a request for postponement. 223 Because a defendant
has no duty to bring himself to trial, the state should request a postponement for good cause224 and be put in a position to argue, in the event that
the defendant moves to dismiss, that the defendant waived the prompt
trial penalty.22s One collateral result of such a strategy is that, as a practical matter, a finding of good cause is more likely to be upheld on appeal226 than is a finding of waiver227 or of improper dismissal. 228 If the
216. Howell v. State, 293 Md. 232,443 A.2d 103 (1982).
217. Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 139,461 A.2d 543, 545 (1983), cert. denied, 298
Md. 708,473 A.2d 458 (1984).
218. Cf Joseph, supra note 6, at 633.
219. See generally supra Section IV(B) (good cause for postponement).
220. Briscoe v. State, 48 Md. App. 169, 183,426 A.2d 415, 423 (1981) (quoting English
v. State, 16 Md. App. 439, 443, 298 A.2d 464, 467 (1973».
221. Id. at 182-83, 426 A.2d at 422-23.
222. See Joseph, supra note 6, at 641.
223. See, e.g., Howell v. State, 293 Md. 232, 242, 443 A.2d 103, 108 (1982); Goins v.
State, 293 Md. 97, 112,442 A.2d 550, 558 (1982).
224. See, e.g., Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1,472 A.2d 436 (1984); Goins v. State, 48 Md.
App. 115, 120-21,425 A.2d 1374, 1377-78, affd, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982).
225. "Introduction of common law waiver analysis, with its implicit invitation to result
manipulation through fact characterization, not only stimulates litigation, but also
substantively detracts from the effectiveness of [prompt trial] statutes and rules."
Joseph, supra note 6, at 647. See generally infra note 235 (strategy under MD. R.P.
4-252).
226. See State v. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984); State v. Bonev, 299 Md. 79,
472 A.2d 476 (1984); Rash v. State, 299 Md. 68, 472 A.2d 470 (1984) (per curiam);
State v. Brookins, 299 Md. 59,472 A.2d 465 (1984) (per curiam); State v. Frazier,
298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984).
227. See supra note 225 and accompanying text; see, e.g., State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App.
124, 134-35,458 A.2d 442, 449-50 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984);
Miller v. State, 53 Md. App. 1, 5-6,452 A.2d 180, 182-83 (1982), cert. denied, 295
Md. 302 (1982).
228. Compare State v. Armstrong, 46 Md. App. 641, 421 A.2d 98 (1980) (dismissal of
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state knocks the case out of the 180-day period with a postponement for
good cause motion, it may only have to deal with the more liberal constitutional speedy trial right, and may argue good cause and prompt and
speedy trial waiver against a motion to dismiss. If, on the other hand,
the state's postponement request is denied and, as a result, the denial
becomes non-reviewable, the state may still argue waiver as a defense to
the motion to dismiss. This latter argument, of course, would have been
available even if the state had not requested a postponement in the first
place.
Similarly, it was not clear at first from the reported decisions
whether a defendant has any obligation to show good cause when requesting a postponement to beyond the 180-day period, or whether such
a request constitutes "seeking" a violation of the prompt trial provisions,
resulting in waiver of the penalty as a matter oflaw. 229 A fair reading of
the prompt trial provisions dictates that all involved must show good
cause when effecting any prompt trial postponement. 230 This reading is
second case brought to circumvent 18O-day rule upheld) with State v. Farinholt, 54
Md. App. 124,458 A.2d 442 (1983) (dismissal reversed on showing of waiver), affd,
299 Md. 32, 472 A.2d 452 (1984) and State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20, 425 A.2d
1051 (dismissal reversed on showing of waiver), cert. denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981); cf
Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 137-39,461 A.2d 543, 544-45 (1983), cerro denied,
298 Md. 708,473 A.2d 458 (1984) (grant of postponement to allow state to respond
to motion to dismiss is within ordinary discretion of court).
229. See State V. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 335,403 A.2d 356, 369 (1979). Compare Goins V.
State, 48 Md. App. 115, 119-21,425 A.2d 1374, 1377-78 (1981) (good cause found),
affd on other grounds, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982) with State V. Lattisaw, 48
Md. App. 20, 27-29, 425 A.2d 1051, 1055-56 (agreement by counsel to trial date
beyond 180-day period considered waiver), cert. denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981). See
a/so supra text accompanying notes 190-91 (waiver where defendant or counsel
"seek" postponement).
230. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1984); Md. R.P. 746 (Supp. 1983); MD.
R.P. 4-271; see, e.g., State V. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318,403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979)
(prompt trial provisions bind prosecution and defense alike); see also Hughes V.
State, 288 Md. 216, 229, 421 A.2d 69, 75-76 (1980) (defendant must show good
cause to justify a continuance beyond 180 days); State V. Farinholt, 54 Md. App.
124, 134-35, 458 A.2d 442, 447-49 (1983) (the defendant or the state may request
postponement, or the court may raise the issue sua sponte), affd, 299 Md. 32, 472
A.2d 452 (1984); Goins V. State, 48 Md. App. 115, 119,425 A.2d 1374, 1377 (1981),
affd, 293 Md. 97, 442 A.2d 550 (1982) (defendant or state must show good cause to
justify continuance past 180 days). But see State V. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 334, 403
A.2d 356, 369 (1979) (consent to postponement by defendant in violation of prompt
trial provisions waives penalty); but see also Miller V. State, 53 Md. App. 1, 5-6,452
A.2d 180, 182-83 (1982) (waiver by failure to object to placement of case on move
list), cert. denied, 295 Md. 302 (1983); State V. Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20, 28, 29,
425 A.2d 1051, 1054, 1055-56 (waiver need not be express), cerro denied, 290 Md.
717 (1981). Because the prompt trial provisions were enacted "not solely to implement the defendant's right to a speedy trial, which is already constitutionally protected, but to protect society from the harms of unnecessarily delayed criminal
trials," Carter V. State, 54 Md. App. 220, 226, 458 A.2d 480, 483 (1983), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. State V. Beard, 299 Md. 472, 474 A.2d 514 (1984), the provisions "hold [defendants'] feet to the fire," Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. at 27, 425 A.2d at
1055, and the better rule is to require them to meet the good cause condition also.
[d. See generally supra Section IV(B) (good cause for postponement).
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reinforced by the Hicks court's obsession with the public interest in
prompt and efficient disposition of criminal cases. 231
VI.

MOTION TO DISMISS: MARYLAND RULE 4-252

Once a defendant's trial date is improperly postponed beyond the
ISO-day period, the defendant must file a motion to dismiss that complies
with ~aryland Rule 4-252.232 Procedurally, "[i]f a defendant files a
timely, written motion to dismiss on the date of trial, it then becomes the
option of the State to argue the motion at that time or to request a postponement 'to prepare its justification for whatever is alleged and prayed
by the [defendant's] motion to dismiss.' "233 Although Maryland Rule 4252(c) and (d) contemplate a written motion to dismiss filed prior to
trial, the court of appeals has held, under former Rule 736, that the trial
judge has wide discretion and may entertain a motion made orally on the
day of trial. 234
231. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 316-18, 403 A.2d 356, 359-60 (1979); see State v.
Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984); State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20, 27,
425 A.2d 1051, 1055 (dictum), cerL denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981).
232. MD. RP. 4-252(c)-(f) governs motions to dismiss for violations of defendants'
rights to prompt trial as well as speedy trial, and reads in pertinent part:
c. Other Motions.-A motion asserting failure of the charging document
to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense may be raised and
determined at any time. Any other defense, objection, or request capable
of determination before trial without trial of the general issue, shall be
raised by motion filed at any time before trial.
d. Content.-A motion filed pursuant to this Rule shall be in writing
unless the court otherwise directs, shall state the grounds upon which it is
made, and shall set forth the relief sought. A motion alleging an illegal
source of information as the basis for probable cause must be supported by
precise and specific factual averments. Every motion shall contain or be
accompanied by a statement of points and citation of authorities.
e. Response.-A response, if made, shall be filed within 15 days after
service of the motion and contain or be accompanied by a statement of
points and citation of authorities.
f. Determination.-Motions filed pursuant to this Rule shall be determined before trial and, to the extent practicable, before the day of trial,
except that the court may defer until after trial its determination of a motion to dismiss for failure to obtain a speedy trial. If factual issues are
involved in determining the motion, the court shall state its findings on the
record.
Implicit in this requirement is an opportunity for the state to prepare its opposition
within the time limits prescribed by the Rule. Carey v. State, 54 Md. App. 448, 44951,458 A.2d 90, 91-92 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 17, 21 n.2, 472 A.2d 444, 446 n.2
(1984). See infra text accompanying note 233 (option of state to prepare response
within 15 days).
233. Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 139, 461 A.2d 543, 545 (1983) (quoting Pennington v. State, 53 Md. App. 538,542 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 299 Md. 23,
472 A.2d 447 (1984», cerL denied, 298 Md. 708,473 A.2d 458 (1984); see also supra
note 232 (state's opportunity to prepare opposition to motion).
234. Rash v. State, 299 Md. 68, 71, 472 A.2d 470,471 (1984); Pennington v. State, 299
Md. 23, 28, 472 A.2d 447, 449-50 (1984); Carey v. State, 299 Md. 17, 20-21, 472
A.2d 444, 446 (1984); State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 436-37 n.ll, 470 A.2d 1269,
1277 n.ll (1984).
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As to substance, the allegations of the defendant and the response by
the state must be articulate and organized and must distinguish between
issues of good cause, waiver, and constitutional speedy triaJ.23S When
dealing with a motion to dismiss for a prompt trial violation, the only
relevant postponement is that which caused the trial date to be postponed beyond the ISO-day period. 236 This singular focus is important
because it differs from the constitutional speedy trial analysis on the total
length of delay, and it involves no balancing test or calculations of time
chargeable to each party, as does the constitutional provision.'237 Thus, it
235. See Md. R.P. 736(e) (1977); MD. R.P. 4-252(d), (e). In State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md.
App. 20, 425 A.2d 1051, cert. denied, 290 Md. 717 (1981), the court of special
appeals described one attempt by the state to oppose a motion to dismiss filed that
same morning:
The State defended these motions [to dismiss] on the ground that, by
consenting to the trial date of June 9, [defendants], through their counsel,
were in part responsible for the violation of the Rule. A precise theory
was not clearly articulated. At one point, the State's Attorney seemed to
apply the Constitutional balancing test, allocating certain periods of time
to the State and other periods to the defense; intermingled with this were
suggestions of waiver or the existence of "good cause" for the violation of
the [provisions].
[d. at 22-23, 425 A.2d at 1052-53; cf. Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. I, 5 n.2, 472 A.2d
436, 438 n.2 (1984) (confusion of prompt trial with constitutional speedy trial by
court). As a part of general strategy, defense counsel should file an early demand
for a speedy trial, since the defendant's assertion of his constitutional speedy trial
right is an important factor in the Barker v. Wingo balancing test. See Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S 514, 530-33 (1972). Although there is no demand requirement
under the prompt trial provisions, a defendant may file such a demand. See Pennington v. State, 53 Md. App. 538, 544, 454 A.2d 879, 882 (1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 299 Md. 23,472 A.2d 447 (1984). The defendant may then move to dismiss on both grounds in order to preserve both issues for possible appellate review.
See, e.g., Grant v. State, 299 Md. 47, 53 n.3, 472 A.2d 459, 462-63 n.3 (1984);
Larsen v. State, 55 Md. App. 135, 137, 461 A.2d 543, 544 (1983), cert. denied, 298
Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458 (1984); State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 135-36, 458
A.2d 442, 450 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). See generally Note,
supra note 34, at 489-92 (prompt v. speedy trial criteria); supra note 183 (preserving
the record). Conversely, the state, having received a postponement early on, may
then argue both good cause and waiver against a motion to dismiss. See generally
supra text accompanying notes 224-31 (prompt trial strategy).
236. See, e.g., Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984); State v. Frazier, 298
Md. 422, 427-28, 470 A.2d 1269, 1272 (1984).
237. See, e.g., Satchell v. State, 299 Md. 42, 45-46, 472 A.2d 457, 458 (1984); Goins v.
State, 293 Md. 97, 105, 112,442 A.2d 550, 554, 558 (1982); Monge v. State, 55 Md.
App. 72, 80, 461 A.2d 21, 27 (1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 708, 473 A.2d 458
(1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264, 458 A.2d 487,490, affd, 299 Md. 72,
472 A.2d 472 (1984); State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 130,458 A.2d 442, 447
(1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984). In Goins v. State, 293 Md. 197,442
A.2d 550 (1982), both the administrative judge and the court of special appeals
applied a " 'balancing test' to determine which side was responsible for the delay
and which side benefitted from the delay." [d. at 105,442 A.2d at 554. The court
of appeals affirmed, but for different reasons, stating that
[the prompt trial provisions] contain their own mechanism for dealing
with a case where the defendant, by some dilatory action, has made it
virtually impossible to try a criminal case within the 180-day time limit.
That mechanism is a motion, supported by good cause, by the State or the
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is incorrect to tally up how much time is to be assessed each side and
grant dismissal if the state has delayed over 180 days.238 Once a trial
date is postponed beyond the period for good cause shown, the prompt
trial provisions no longer apply, and the defendant's rights are measured
only by constitutional speedy trial requirements. 239 The speedy trial issue should also be asserted in the motion to dismiss for decision at trial
and to preserve the issue for possible appellate review. 240 Finally, denial
of a motion to dismiss may only be appealed after final judgment.241 If,
however, the granting of the motion results in dismissal of the charges
the state may appeal immediately.242
In deciding a motion to dismiss under prompt trial analysis, the trial
judge must address three basic issues: (1) whether the trial date has been
postponed beyond the 180-day period; and, if so, (2) whether good cause
was found by the hearing judge; and, if not, (3) whether the defendant
waived his right to the dismissal penalty. As the court of appeals set out
in State v. Fraizer :243
Consequently, with regard to the postponement of a criminal
trial for good cause, it is the administrative judge's exercise of
judgment with which those later reviewing the matter are concerned. Another nisi prius judge, ruling on a motion to dismiss
for an alleged violation of §591 and Rule 746, has been deprived of the authority to exercise independent judgment concerning good cause for postponement. 244 . . . . This is not to
say that a trial judge has no role when there is a motion to
dismiss based upon an asserted violation of §591 and Rule 746.
As the Hicks and Goins cases make clear, a trial judge entertaining such a motion must ordinarily grant it if the case was
not tried within 180 days and if the trial was not postponed
beyond that deadline in accordance with the statute and rule.
But in making this determination, when reviewing a postpone-

238.

239.
240.

241.
242.
243.
244.

court itself for a postponement of the trial date, so long as the motion is
granted or approved by the county administrative judge.
!d. at 112, 442 A.2d at 558.
See, e.g., Goins, 293 Md. at 105,442 A.2d at 554; Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1,472
A.2d 436,438 (1984); State v. Green, 54 Md. App. 260, 264, 458 A.2d 487,490,
affd, 299 Md. 72,472 A.2d 472 (1984); State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 128,
458 A.2d 442, 446 (1983), affd, 299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984) (improper computation by court).
See supra note 45 and accompanying text (interplay between prompt and speedy
trial rights issue).
See, e.g., State v. Farinholt, 54 Md. App. 124, 135-36,458 A.2d 442 (1983), affd,
299 Md. 32,472 A.2d 452 (1984); Pennington v. State, 53 Md. App. 538, 540 n.l,
454 A.2d 879, 881 n.1 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 299 Md. 23, 472 A.2d 447
(1984); see also supra note 235 and accompanying text (prompt trial strategy).
MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CoDE ANN. § 12-301 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
See id. at § 12-302(i). See generally Loker, supra note 28, at 31-32 (prompt trial
strategy for prosecution).
298 Md. 422, 470 A.2d 1269 (1984).
Id. at 450, 470 A.2d at 1284.
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ment beyond the 180-day deadline ordered by the administrative judge, deference must be accorded the judgment of the
administrative judge and those assignment personnel acting
under his supervision. We hold, therefore, as follows: with regard to both components of the "good cause" requirement in
§59l and Rule 746, the trial judge (as well as an appellate
court) shall not find an absence of good cause unless the defendant meets the burden of demonstrating either a clear abu~e
of discretion or a lack of good cause as a matter of law. 24S
. . . . Finally, the party challenging the discretionary ruling
on a motion for a postponement has the burden of demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion. 246
VII.

CONCLUSION
Under the Maryland prompt trial provisions, a criminal defendant
charged in the circuit court must be brought to trial within 180 days of
his initial appearance or the charges must be dismissed with prejudice.
Two exceptions to this rule are good cause shown for postponement beyond the l80-day period, and waiver of dismissal by defendant or counsel. A distillation of State v. Hicks, and the decisions following it, reveal
certain mechanics of the provisions with which practitioners must familiarize themselves when handling prompt trial issues. These include applicability of the provisions, setting the initial trial date, postponement of
the trial date, the dismissal penalty and waiver thereof, and making or
opposing a motion to dismiss. Once these mechanics are understood, the
substantive and procedural requirements of the prompt trial provisions
may be approached in a more organized manner by both bench and bar.

245. Id. at 454, 470 A.2d at 1286.
246. Id. at 452, 470 A.2d at 1285.

